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Concept Development and the Psychology of Education 
JON GURNEY 
Institute of Education, University of London 
When faced with a two-part title such as I have for the title of this paper, an obvious 
approach would be to start with the second idea; the study of what is going on in 
developmental psychology as someone is educated, and try to illuminate the first; 
what are these mysterious mental entities 'concepts' and how do they develop? I 
intend, however, to reverse this order of explanation. What I want to do is give a no-
doubt rushed and biased account of the development of our philosophical thinking 
about 'concepts' and from that attempt to draw useful pointers to how we can think 
about education with hopefully an emphasis on the psychology involved. What I shall 
do is give examples from three separate areas of philosophy where as I see it we have 
the same themes emerging as to 'what thinking is', and then attempt to apply these 
themes to the psychology of education. I do this not only because I happen to know a 
lot more about philosophy than developmental psychology, but because as we shall 
see, the overarching moral that I wish to draw is that very often we have made, and 
can make progress by reversing common-sense ways of looking at issues. 
The plan of the paper, therefore, is in four parts. Firstly I shall look at some 
philosophy of language and outline one approach to analysing concept-use. In a 
nutshell, what we shall see is that an approach is needed that respects both the 
subjective and the objective nature of thinking, the degree to which we are 
autonomous and free, where it is 'up to us' and our responsibility how we use 
concepts to think with; and also the degree to which authority over that use of 
concepts lies outside us, and hence we are constrained. In the second section I shall 
outline a piece of political philosophy that I think gives a nice concrete example of the 
approach I support and helps us to see how it may be applied to educational questions. 
In part three I turn to ethics to again illustrate in a less abstract way what implications 
there might be. Finally I shall attempt to derive some lessons for how to think about 
psychology given what we have said. 
For a majority of human history the thinking on the matter of concepts was pretty 
much agreed; they were structures that you thought with that somehow 'resembled' or 
'represented' what one was thinking about, and that were made up of definitions (see 
Margolis & Laurence (1999) for an overview of the field). Thus 'out there' would be 
a furry, purry animal and a nice rug and 'in here' was a concept CAT that referred to 
the animal and another, MAT, to the rug and in your brain you put these together and 
thought that the cat was on the mat. Note that what concepts are is taken to be the first 
priority, and then we worry about what to do with them once we have whatever they 
are. For sure there were arguments, notably around how we get CAT into our heads, 
whether as the rationalists would have it, you let 'necessary ideas' come to you and 
built up from there, or as the empiricists preferred, you experienced the furry purry 
animal which somehow 'gave' you the idea CAT through 'association'. But once you 
had them, you shuffled them around and combined them and that was thought. Note 
again the essentially passive nature of this for the thinker, concepts on this view are 
very much something we take in or absorb, or in the recent words of Jerry Fodor, 
© 2009 The Author 
164 JON GURNEY 
'Thinking isn't something that we do, it is something that happens to us' (Fodor, 
2008). The implications for education of this view are obvious; we simply find out 
what these concepts are, how they are structured, what relation they bear to the world, 
and we get them into people's brains. 
The problem for this whole approach is it doesn't work. No-one has managed 
either a definition of any concept or an account of how we get them that isn't full of 
holes. Defining what the concept CAT is turns out to be incredibly hard to answer; 
not a 'furry purry animal', for a shaved and mute cat is still a cat. Talk of feline DNA 
involves circularity as well as seeming to imply that pre-1950 no-one knew what they 
were talking about. Nowadays psychologists create connectionist networks that 
distribute the CATness across probabilistic webs very cleverly, but humans seem to 
be able to combine and produce new thoughts in ways that probabilities don't. As 
regards how content is fixed, currently the most popular modem approach is Fodor's 
version of Davidson's idea that a CAT symbol in the brain is caused by the furry 
purry animal and thus CATness 'flows' into the concept (Fodor, 1990). The problem 
here is that what actually causes the symbol CAT is not necessarily what should; it is 
impossible to say whether what caused our thoughts was a cat, or, perhaps, a squirrel-
seen-in-bad-light without fixing what we mean, or more precisely what we should 
mean by CAT, in other words of checking not only what it is that we think, but 
whether what we think is correct. On these accounts we do think CAT, but ought we 
to think CAT? 
And so there are enormous problems with specifying exactly what are these things, 
these 'concepts' that we possess, which seems to thwart trying to do anything with 
them. This is the first common-sense notion that it is productive to reverse; for a 
parallel line of thinking takes a pragmatic view and asks firstly what is it that 
concepts allow us to do, and then worries about what they are, or to give it a slogan, 
'know-how' comes before 'know-that'. 
This tradition sees concepts themselves as abilities, as patterns of action. 
Although seen as a modem development, we can identify Immanuel Kant as the 
founding father of this way of thinking about thinking (the Kantian ideas developed 
here draw heavily on Brandom, 2007). Kant himself reversed the previous priority of 
the objective over the subjective, and moved from focussing on the thought to 
focussing on the thinker. Despairing of being able to 'check for correctness' against 
the external world, Kant relocated the rules of 'ought' inside the subject. On this 
reading, to think is to make a judgment, and to take responsibility for that judgment. 
As Sellars developed the Kantian line, to think at all is to bind oneself, to place 
oneself in a structure of reasons rather than merely causes (Sellars, 1954; 1963b). 
Some points immediately follow. One cannot start with the standalone concept CAT, 
as what sort of responsible judgment could this be? One starts by thinking that the cat 
is on the mat, from which we can derive what CAT contributes to the thought. The 
meaning of concepts should be seen now primarily as being about what one should do 
with language, rather than about what is out in the world; concepts become rules for 
forming judgments. 
As mentioned, Kant saw these rules, these norms that set not only what our 
thoughts are but what they should be, as what I shall call 'I-rules', rules that operate 
within and upon an individual as the subject. There is an immediate problem that was 
drawn most vividly by Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1953/2005); if our thoughts and 
whether they are correct is simply up to us, how could we ever be wrong? The 
excesses of objectivity outlined above have swung too far, leaving us with a totally 
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idiosyncratic picture where, like Humpty Dumpty in Alice in Wonderland, 'when I 
use a word, it means whatever I want it to mean' . 
As a footnote, it would take us too far afield to properly address the matter, but 
this is the weakness with the educational philosophy of Kant's descendents the 
Radical Constructivists (for example, see Glasersfeld, 1995). This laudable attempt to 
give autonomy and conceptual-control back to the thinker drifts into indeterminacy if 
only 'I-rules' constrain the use of those concepts. If I can never be objectively wrong 
in judgment, then I can never be right and my thoughts become meaningless unless 
this is mysteriously' given' to me through experience. 
The problem is that Kant located both responsibility and authority in the same 
subject; he correctly portrayed rationality as being liable to assessment, but then made 
the candidate the assessor. As Brandom puts it, one has to bind oneself, but one also 
has to bind oneself and answer to rules that to some degree are 'outside us' (Brandom, 
2007). The obvious place to locate authority 'outside us' is in the social. As Meredith 
Williams has it, we hold each other in 'mutual policing' (Williams, 1991), our 
attitudes to what others are allowed to do with concepts or banned from doing with 
other concepts can provide an objectivity to the rules that set what the concept is. We 
should note, however, for it will emerge as important in the last section, that the social 
may indeed have authority but it does not have power; nothing can make us use 
concepts in a certain way or force us to follow norms of correctness, there are no 
'they-rules' or social categorical imperatives which are handed down from 'on-high' 
to take away our own role in judgment. Famously Wittgenstein proclaimed that 
'meaning is use'; on this more recent reading, a concept's meaning is how it ought to 
be used, as inferred from the games of 'deontic scorekeeping' we apply to ourselves 
and others (a full defence of this can be found in Lance & O'Leary-Hawthorne, 1997). 
And so, if one declares that the cat is indeed on the mat, one may agree that a 
mammal is on the mat, and one must not also claim the cat is in the air. From this 
pattern of attitudes emerges the meaning of CAT, MAT and what have you. It follows, 
as Sellars saw, that to think at all one must already have determinate concepts 
available for one can make judgments with (Sellars, 1963a), but on this account the 
pattern of correct usage is already fixed through the pre-existing linguistic uses of 
others. 
Weare seeing another strange inversion of common-sense appear. On the reading 
I am outlining, what a concept means does not describe anything out in the world, it is 
not 'about' any fact. The declaration 'CAT means furry purry animal' does not tell us 
of a relation between a word and the world, but attempts to influence others in their 
future use of the concept. To declare what a concept means is to endorse how to apply 
it, it is to make a recommendation, to urge rather than to state. This is what O'Leary 
calls the 'constitution picture' (Lance & O'Leary-Hawthorne, 1997), where taking on 
a concept's meaning is to actively accept a system of permissions and obligations, 
much as the meaning of a piece of legislation lies in the pattern of permissions and 
obligations that ensue from it. And what emerges is something exciting if unexpected. 
This binding of oneself by reasons allows new abilities, the abilities to use concepts to 
express novel thoughts. We see a kind of positive freedom emerge for the subject, a 
freedom that, in Brandom' s words, is rational self-constraint. In an episode of the TV 
programme 'The West Wing' a character declares 'I'm in favour of freedom. And 
freedom stands opposed to constraint'. They couldn't be more wrong. A form of 
freedom is constraint, or in a lovely phrase 'self-expression through acquiescence' 
(Brandom, 1979). 
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The theme I wish to draw from this to carry forward is the way that we can walk 
between objectivity and subjectivity, between 'they-rules' and 'I-rules' and find a 
form of 'we-rules'. As Brandom puts it, our concepts are both attitude-dependent in 
that we can autonomously choose whether to use them, and attitude independent in 
that we cannot then choose the significance of using them. Concepts as rules can be 
seen as like the rules of chess; we are free to choose that we play chess and follow the 
rules, but not what the rules are. But note; only by accepting one to be constrained by 
the rules, is one able to play chess. One is not more free who throws the pieces on the 
floor, or moves them any which way, for they cannot play the game. In the same way 
I am free and responsible to declare the cat to be on the mat or otherwise, but not free 
to define what it is that I have judged. The self uses a system and is responsible for 
judgment, but the other sets what the content of those judgments are. I find it 
productive to think of concepts on this pattern as like laws; the speed limit, for 
example, let us say is 80km/h. This does not tell us what cars 'out there' on the roads 
are actually doing (although there may well be quite a tight correlation), and to 
change the speed limit we do not go out & look at cars or change how they are driven. 
The speed limit is a pattern of social benefits and sanctions, 'you may do this' 'you 
must do that' that we hold ourselves and others to, a role in a system that thus sets the 
content of what it means. 
It is this talk of 'laws' that leads me to consider the political philosophy outlined 
in John Searle's Freedom and Neurobiology (Searle, 2007). Searle is concerned with 
what he calls 'social reality', the realm where objects and roles have this 'dual nature' 
that straddles the subjective and the objective, that only exist if people take them to 
exist, yet on those terms can be seen as 'really real'. The classic example is money. A 
1,000 yen note in one sense is attitude-dependent, ifno-one recognised or accepted it 
as such, it would not be money. Yet given that we do accept the system of norms 
within which it plays a part, it really truly is 1,000 yen; I have autonomy and indeed 
responsibility to make the judgment and accept that it is money, yet I do not then have 
the authority myself to determine what it is worth. Searle locates the source of this 
'institutional reality' in the particularly human ability to use language to accept that, 
in his formulation 'x counts as y', to accept systems that we will bind ourselves and 
others by in our attitudes in acting as if one object (for example, a piece of paper, or a 
sound from our mouths) can be taken for another (monetary value, or a linguistic 
move in the 'game of giving and asking for reasons'). Searle then places the 
normativity of political power in exactly the same framework as I have outlined the 
normativity of conceptual meaning; a linguistically encoded system of rules that if 
accepted then can indeed constrain us yet allow for a positive form of freedom. Thus 
in his words 'all political power, though exercised from above, comes from below'. 
What this suggests is another area where 'normativity', in other words where one 
encounters duties, permissions and obligations, where one can be judged correct or 
not, or evaluated-such as playing a role in a political system or as we had before 
applying concepts-is both up to us in that the very existence of the system depends 
on our mutual attitude of acceptance towards it, and outside us in that its content is 
pre-'set'. All political power, claims Searle, is deontic power, the power to set the 
expectations on people that we hold each other to, as constituted, and not merely 
described, by language. 
And again, this creates a positive freedom in that through language,humans alone 
in the animal kingdom can develop, determine and operate under desire-independent 
reasons for action, a space of reason that we are both responsible for and responsible 
to. We also see again how statements of political power, for example 'the LDP is the 
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governing party in Japan' are primarily not descriptive but prescriptive; much like 
statements of what concepts 'mean', they outline and decree what we should or can 
do when operating within those systems, rather than tell us what the world is like. 
I have outlined examples where it is productive to consider concepts as abilities 
and to analyse abilities, or powers, be they expressive, linguistic or political as more 
akin to ethics than to science, to see thinking as more a part of a world 'fraught with 
ought' than a world of brute causes, and to see communication of this thinking as 
more like legislating and persuading than describing or transmitting. As a final 
example I look at the account of rationality offered by Allan Gibbard (Gibbard, 1990; 
1994). Gibbard broadens out this approach to all judgments of correctness, be they 
ethical statements of moral correctness, rational statements of what 'makes sense' or 
semantic statements of conceptual meaning. In his so-called 'norm-expressivism' all 
of these judgments are not descriptions but endorsements, to say a concept is moral, 
rational or correctly applied is not to speak of anything being 'true' or 'false' but is to 
express acceptance of a system of rules that permits that concept. To take an example, 
the phrase 'it is correct to say that the whale is a mammal' is not 'about' any fact or 
property in the world, but expresses acceptance of the system of norms which would 
entail 'is a mammal' from 'whale'. We can see again the pragmatic order of priority, 
in first looking at what we are doing in making claims, rather than it what they are. 
Thus the purpose of all normative talk for Gibbard, be it ethical or epistemological, is 
an attempt to create consensus in order to co-ordinate our uses so as to accord with 
linguistically-encoded rules together. Language on this account allows shared 
evaluation of each others' judgments and agreements and negotiations as to future 
judgments, it is how we exert mutual influence and create structures if reasons that are 
only created by and only operative upon humans. Again we have an account which 
sees the very nature of concepts as not representations of the world but attempts to 
influence our social practices in describing the world. The 'mapping' that is attempted 
is not world-mind but a mapping of your commitments onto mine in reciprocal 
recognition. On this account to 'teach' a concept becomes less to make statements 
about the world than to stipulate or legislate what systems of rules should be accepted 
so as to bring about co-ordination and consensus in our practices. We stop seeing 'it is 
correct to ... ' as being true or false, but an expression and a suggestion of how to go 
on. 
And so, finally, I shall attempt to draw some tentative conclusions from this 
account of how to look at concepts. What I am suggesting overall, is that the 
epistemology and psychology of education fits this same normative structure; an 
authority that has the dual nature of existing only insofar as it is taken to exist by the 
subject, but then is objectively binding upon the subject, that a subject expresses 
acceptance of in making judgments as to how to use concepts, how to hold others to 
their use of concepts and how to accept others' authority over their use of concepts. 
Firstly I claim that where the psychology of education has been concerned with 
belief, we should think more about acceptances (for this distinction to be spelt out see 
Tuomela, 2000). Beliefs can be seen as passive, often involuntary states that combine 
with desires to cause action. A dog can be said to 'believe'. In contrast, to 'accept' is 
a voluntary, active process that involves bringing oneself under a desire-independent 
reason, a process that requires and is part-constituted by language, a uniquely human 
phenomenon. Here we see the importance of autonomy and the idea of freedom; what 
I have claimed is that if the subject does not accept rules of correctness thought, then 
in a sense they have no hold over her, they can even be said not to exist. The correct 
use of concepts, like the rules of a game are indeed social facts, which Durkheim 
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declared can 'be recognised by the power of external coercion which it exercises ... 
over individuals' (Durkheim, 189511964, p. 10). Part correct; I am indeed 'coerced' 
by the rules of the game in the sense that I 'cannot' move a chess pawn diagonally or 
declare the whale a fish, but only if 1 accept that 1 am playing the game. There is a 
story that in the 19th century a foreign ship ran aground in the British port of 
Hartlepool with a monkey on board. After torturing the poor ape, the locals apparently 
decided that it was a French spy and hanged it. Now clearly the social web of 
acceptances did not make the monkey a spy, and in the same way we cannot 
externally coerce someone into being a learner through identification. If I agree to 
give up co-ordinating with others in playing chess or studying biology (or, crucially, 
like the monkey was never aware that I was playing that game) then any sense of 
'correctness' falls away. Teaching on this view cannot be 'drilling', cannot be training 
in a Pavlovian sense, but more of a negotiation, an urging of the subject to accept 
systems of correctness that bring consensus and coordination and create her as 'one of 
us'. Pedagogical power, though exercised from above, comes from below, and there is 
a positive freedom required from the subject as learning involves self-expression. 
The second point comes from continuing Brandom's phrase; 'self-expression 
through acquiescence'. I have talked of systems that are both subjective and objective, 
that require acceptance that they hold, but are attitude-independent in what they hold. 
On this view the autonomy of learners does not extend to content, teachers have the 
authority, as representatives of the social, to stipulate and legislate what the rules of 
correctness are. This should quash any justification for any moves towards facile 
relativism or any reluctance to apply the word 'wrong' to a leamer's thinking. There 
is a clear asymmetry operating; the social location of authority is not a democracy; as 
Brandom puts it, the correct application of the concept 'molybdenum' is not put to a 
vote, but laid down by pre-eminent chemists (Brandom, 2007). We here see again the 
distinction that Meredith Williams makes when saying that teachers have 'authority 
not power' over what is learnt (Williams, 1991). Obviously teachers cannot change 
the world by decreeing the whale a mammal, nor force anyone to agree, but they can 
influence social practice of use so that the concepts are used correctly. As Williams 
puts it 'the novice acts, the expert endows with meaning', in other words, holds the 
novice accountable within systems of norms. Note, again, the central importance of 
actively using language in this process prevents a retreat into mindless behaviourism. 
This Williams describes aptly as 'calibration'; psychological development in 
education seen not as describing facts about the world but structuring patterns of use 
to produce coordination. Thus the teacher's words 'the whale is a mammal' can be 
seen as not first and foremost about the world but about words, it is a 
recommendation or endorsement of how the learner should use language, in the same 
way as calibrating a ruler sets what, say, a centimetre is, stipulating the norms of 
conceptual use set their content. 
Finally there is an internal point for the psychology of education. I have been 
talking of accounts which move between subjectivity and objectivity, an attempt to 
characterise 'we-rules' rather than 'I-rules' or 'they-rules'. And this could have 
implications for lectures one and two in 'Education 101 '; to brutally parody complex 
bodies of work; 'Piaget: it's all internal', 'Vygotsky: no it's not, it's all external'. 
Perhaps we are approaching a conclusion in the best pluralist liberal tradition, 'it's 
something in between' . 
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